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IBC vs. Pentagon’s Iraq War Logs
 IBC
 UK NGO
 Media, Iraqi government, morgues 
 Violent civilian deaths from beginning up to now
 Iraq War Logs
 Pentagon’s archives
 Leaked by Wikileaks in 2010 (Manning and Assange): “A scoop of the 
century”
 Violent deaths between 2004 and 2009 (except May 2004 and March 2009)
 Similarities
 Incident-based records (see picture)
 Persistency
 Behavioural differences between US military authorities and media  
IBC vs. Pentagon’s Iraq War Logs cont.
 IBC
 Only civilians (non-combatants)
 Minimum and maximum
 Police in non-paramilitary roles (i.e., traffic police)
 Iraq War Logs
 Civilians : Civilians
 Host Nation: Iraqi security forces (police)
 Enemy: Insurgents and anti-coalition forces
 Friendly: Coalition forces
IBC vs. Pentagon’s Iraq War Logs cont.
Data Pentagon’s War Logs IBC Dataset
Categories Civilian Host nation Enemy
Civilian + Host 
nation
Minimum Maximum
Number of
deaths
(Baghdad)
66,081
(56%)
15,196
(33%)
23,984
(27%)
81,277
(52%)
85,132
(54%)
92,027
(54%)
Number of 
34,009 8,064 9,417 42,073 21,865 22,108
incidents
Deaths per 
incidents
1.94 1.88 2.55 1.93 3.89 4.16
Duration 70 months during 2004-2009 (except May 2004 and Mar 2009)
IBC vs. Pentagon’s Iraq War Logs cont.
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Monthly Civilian Fatalities
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Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality 
test p value = .000
Without 2004 and 
2005 = . 280
Forecasting with VAR
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Conclusion
 Both are incomplete lists
 Both are consistent with each other if excluding 2004 and 
2005
 Comparative analysis could provide a clue of significantly 
different standards between US military authorities and media 
in counting violent civilian deaths
 Media may have inflated the number of violent deaths
 US military authorities might have been…
 Less attentive  in counting civilian deaths at the initial period
 Less mindful in distinguishing civilian losses out of insurgent deaths in major 
military offensives
Conclusion cont.
“We don’t do body counts” 
-Gen Tommy Franks, 2002-
 Political implications
 Precise counting is requisite 
To enhance civilian protection 
 To understand evolutionary intensity of war
 If IBC is closer to true number,  the US seems to have failed to grasp 
reality in Iraq at the initial period
 Great transparency and consistency will help military authorities
 To understand spread of violence
 To prevent unnecessary escalation  
